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Abstract
This article uses agent-based computer simulation to investigate the dynamics of policy diffusion
through learning. It compares these dynamics across state systems in which policy-makers possess
different capabilities to learn about policy effectiveness: independent decision-makers focusing on
own experiences vs. interdependent social learners relying heavily on experiences of others. The
simulation can thus compare policy adoption patterns in the presence and absence of policy diffu-
sion within a controlled setting. The simulation makes two propositions. First, it supports the
existing critique that relying on the identification of policy clusters can lead researchers to draw
false positive conclusions about the relevance of policy diffusion. Second, it suggests that relying
on the identification of policy volatility under political stability minimizes this risk.
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1. Introduction
While empirical research on policy diffusion predominantly concludes that policy
decisions are interdependent and policy change often results from learning-induced
diffusion processes (e.g. Gilardi, 2010; Meseguer, 2009; Simmons and Elkins,
2004), critical voices have come to doubt the validity of empirical evidence gener-
ally taken to support these conclusions. Volden et al. (2008) argue that the
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empirical patterns of policy adoptions taken to indicate policy diffusion could also
have emerged through individual problem-solving by independent states.
Essentially, this point of criticism suggests that conventional tests used to assess
whether or not policies diffuse—such as spatial lag regression—can at times sug-
gest policy diffusion when policy decisions are really independent. In statistics, this
would be referred to as ‘type-I error’ or ‘false positive result’ (e.g. Cohen, 1977: 4–
5): the null hypothesis of independent policy decisions is rejected although policy
adoptions really were independent. By solely relying on the identification of policy
clusters to draw conclusions about policy diffusion, we thus risk overestimating the
relevance of policy diffusion under the impression of false positive results. Against
this background, Volden et al. (2008) suggest investing theoretically in order to
identify characteristics of ‘behavior that emerges only in a cross-state learning envi-
ronment’ (Volden et al., 2008: 329). Such characteristics can be used by empirical
research to better distinguish between interdependent processes of policy diffusion
and isolated, independent policy decisions.
This article proposes that agent-based modeling and computerized simulation
can be helpful tools supporting the development of innovative theoretical proposi-
tions about effects and characteristics of policy diffusion through learning.
Therefore, a computerized simulation is presented that models the effects of differ-
ent forms of learning (individual learning and social learning) and the effect of
imperfect information on the dynamics of policy adoption patterns in a closed net-
work of 49 states.1 The simulation makes two propositions. First, it supports argu-
ments pointing to the risk of false positive conclusions about policy diffusion when
these conclusions rely on the identification of policy clusters. Second, it proposes
that this risk can be minimized by focusing on the identification of policy volatility.
Policy volatility refers to the frequency with which policy decisions are reversed.
Policy decisions are considered volatile when initial policy decisions are reversed at
least once (i.e. number of policy changes  2). The simulation suggests that policy
volatility under political stability is a genuine feature of state systems consisting of
interdependent social learners (policy diffusion).
The article first presents a short review of the relevant literature. Second, the
simulation’s theoretical foundations are presented. Third, the article outlines the
basic structure of the simulation. Fourth, results are presented. Finally, the article
concludes with a brief discussion of these results and their implications.
2. Learning, policy volatility, and computerized simulation
Since the 1970s, a vast literature on the role of learning in policy-making has
emerged. This literature shares the assumption that policy-making is not simply the
result of power politics and the interplay of material interests but also the attempt
to solve problems objectively. Learning – defined as the acquisition of new infor-
mation about the ability of specific courses of action to solve the problem at hand
(Sabatier, 1988) – is key to solving problems. For some time, however, most of
these efforts to analyze the role of learning in policy-making remained conceptual
and only a few empirical attempts to isolate the role of learning in policy-making
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were undertaken (Bennett and Howlett, 1992). The theoretical literature on learn-
ing has accumulated a volume of different approaches to learning: Scholars distin-
guish between political learning (Heclo, 1974), governmental learning (Etheredge
and Short, 1981), lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991), and social learning (Hall, 1993), to
name just a few. Lately, this list has been complemented by the distinction between
‘pure learning’ and ‘competitive learning’ (Ward and John, 2013).
Ever since the call for more empirical work by Bennett and Howlett in 1992, a
series of scholars have taken up the challenge to analyze policy diffusion through
learning empirically. Because cognitive processes of learning by decision-makers
about public policy are difficult to observe, these studies often rely on spatial pat-
terns of policy adoption (e.g. Gilardi, 2010; Meseguer, 2009; Simmons and Elkins,
2004). While the observation of clustered policy adoption is taken as evidence for
policy diffusion, critics argue that such clusters could just as well be the result of
individual problem-solving by independent states dealing with similar problems
(e.g. Volden et al., 2008). If we knew about additional indicators for policy diffu-
sion through learning besides spatial clusters of policy adoption, we could reduce
the risk to mistake independent for interdependent policy decisions.
In search for such additional features of interdependent states, the literature on
complex systems—which specifically deals with phenomena emerging in systems
characterized by interaction and interdependency—seems to be a promising source
of inspiration (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Miller and Page, 2007; Vicsek, 2002).
States engaging in policy learning can be interpreted to form a complex social sys-
tem in which individual states seek information about policy effectiveness and
where the experiences and perceptions of one state influences the experiences and
perceptions elsewhere. The interactions which state A has with state B are thus not
independent from the interactions that state B previously had with state C. Agent-
based computer simulation has proved to be an effective tool for analyzing beha-
vior of such complex systems. It is used to investigate the dynamics of processes
resulting from complex social interactions. It allows models to contain heteroge-
neous agents and does not restrict the researcher to create models with closed-
form, analytic solutions (Miller and Page, 2007). The advantage of this approach
over conventional approaches to formal modeling is that it is designed to enable
researchers to focus on the characteristics of process instead of equilibrium and to
assess shifts dynamically and not through comparative statics. This way, agent-
based computer simulation has successfully inspired theoretical debates in different
disciplines, such as sociology or economics (Axelrod, 1997; Strang and Macy,
2001; Vriend, 2000). In the context of political science, this approach has been
fruitfully introduced to research on party competition (Kollman et al., 1992), elec-
toral systems (Clough, 2007), and conflict research (Cederman, 2003; Lustick et
al., 2004). Against this background, it is surprising that, besides two notable excep-
tions (Luyet, 2009; Rapaport et al., 2009), there are—to my knowledge—no
attempts to apply this tool to the study of policy diffusion.
The ability of agent-based modeling to focus on process instead of equilibrium
also allows the analysis to focus on a concept hardly recognized and often only
integrated implicitly in the analysis of policy diffusion: policy volatility. Policy
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volatility captures how often policy changes are adopted within a certain period of
time. Naturally, this implies that adoption patterns need to be observed not only
until a policy innovation is introduced for the first time, but also thereafter to cap-
ture potential subsequent policy decisions (i.e. the abolishment of the innovation
and even potentially its re-introduction). Several empirical studies have recognized
the importance of taking this into account. Simmons and Elkins (2004) allow for
vacillations between liberal and protectionist economic policies in their analysis of
policy diffusion. Boehmke and Witmer (2004) do not only keep track of policy
innovation, but also capture subsequent policy expansion in their study of the dif-
fusion of sub-national gambling policy. Similarly, in the context of hospital financ-
ing reforms, Gilardi et al. (2009) not only capture initial policy changes, but also
subsequent reforms which happen after the initial reform. Policy volatility is a
direct measure of how frequently states vacillate between different policy choices.
And despite the fact that many policy decisions are highly persistent, other policy
decisions are clearly volatile. Of course, policy change is often the result of ideolo-
gical changes in government composition. Yet, governments do at times take back
their own previous policy decisions and even re-introduce them after some time
once again. One example for volatile policy decisions is the privatization of public
utilities at the local level in Germany only to re-municipalize them again later on
(Pigeon, 2012). Another example for policy volatility under political stability is the
decision of the conservative Bavarian state government coalition in Germany to
first introduce tuition fees for higher education only to abolish these fees again
later (Die Zeit, 2013). Orthography reform in Germany can also be taken as an
example of a volatile policy decision. In 1996, the conference of state education
ministers,2 including the ministers from Schleswig-Holstein, decided to introduce a
large-scale reform of spelling in the German language. In 1998 Schleswig-Holstein
passed legislation to undo the previously adopted reform, only to join the other
state governments to re-introduce a similar reform in 2006.3 These examples illus-
trate that policy-makers at times vacillate between different policy options.
The analytical leverage that the concept of policy volatility can develop is evi-
dent in the context of theorizing another mechanism of policy diffusion; namely,
competition. It is the recurring change of the status quo policy which is at the heart
of the prominent theoretical proposition that policy interdependence between dif-
ferent policy-makers based on competition creates a ‘race to the bottom’ (Gilardi,
2013: 462–463). Against this background, it seems worthwhile to dedicate more
attention to the concept of policy volatility in the context of other diffusion
mechanisms; such as learning. Consequently, this article moves beyond the conven-
tional assessment of policy adoption patterns in terms of spatial clusters to assess
also these patterns in terms of policy volatility.
3. Theoretical foundation of the simulation
The simulation uses the formal model of policy change and diffusion by Braun and
Gilardi (2006) as theoretical foundation. This section summarizes how their model
integrates learning – among other diffusion mechanisms – into a coherent
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framework of policy change and diffusion. To model policy change, the authors
formulate a situation in which decision-makers are confronted with a choice
between two policies i with i e [sq;other]. Policy i= sq refers to the policy currently
in place (status quo), while policy i= other refers to the alternative (other) policy
which could potentially be adopted. Essentially, Braun and Gilardi argue that pol-
icy change is a matter of comparison between the utility received from the current
policy and the expected utility from an alternative policy. The utility associated
with a certain policy is then a function of its ability to generate votes Vi and its
policy-related payoffs resulting from ideological considerations Pi. Against this
background, the authors assume that decision-makers’ utility from policy i take the
form
Ui =wVi +(1 w)Pi ð1Þ
The factor w weighs the importance of vote-payoffs Vi and ideological policy-
payoffs Pi, respectively. To determine whether to change from the current policy to
an alternative policy, decision-makers compare the current utility against the
expected utility of the alternative policy. To construct this decision, Braun and
Gilardi add additional parameters. First, they allow for unsuccessful attempts to
adopt the new policy by introducing the probability of a successful policy change
p. Second, they include reform costs associated with policy change C. Third, they
introduce policy effectiveness Ei to the equation. This implies that, in the model,
politicians do not only care about votes and ideology, but also about a policy’s
ability to solve certain problems. Against this background, the authors expect
change whenever the expected utility of attempting policy change is greater than
the utility from maintaining the status quo. Change happens if
EU (change).U (status quo) ð2Þ





Learning—understood as the acquisition of new information about the effective-
ness of policy alternatives to solve a certain problem—affects this policy change
equation (4) via the factor Ei. Other things equal, a high effectiveness of the alterna-
tive policy Eother and a low effectiveness of status quo policy Esq make the attempt
to change policies more likely.
The simulation presented here simplifies the work of Braun and Gilardi in three
respects. First, it introduces a modest reinterpretation of the condition for policy
change above. In line with Braun and Gilardi, the right-hand-side of the equation, C
p
,
can be interpreted as the threshold for change TC . For high costs of change and low
probabilities of success, the threshold for change increases. It decreases for low costs
of reform and high probabilities of success. Second, the simulation interprets the
left-hand-side of equation (4) as the utility from change UC. The utility from change
is only positive if the payoffs from the alternative policy outweigh the payoffs of the
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status quo. For high levels of effectiveness and a high utility associated with vote-
payoffs and policy-payoffs from the alternative policy, this utility from change
increases. It decreases with high effectiveness, high vote-payoffs, and high policy-




We thus expect policy change if the utility from change UC of state k at time t is
greater than its threshold for change TCk;t at time t. To avoid a deterministic process,
in a deviation from Braun and Gilardi, the simulation translates this condition for
policy change into a probabilistic function of policy change. This is accomplished
by introducing a stochastic function of logistic type.4 This results in the following
equation (6) reflecting the probability of change







Equation (6) implies that the probability of policy change approaches 1 as the
utility from change at time t, UCk;t, grows in relation to the threshold for change
TCk;t. As the utility from change decreases in relation to the threshold for change,
the probability of change approaches 0.
3.1. Two scenarios of learning
The simulation defines two scenarios which differ only with respect to the capabil-
ities of states to learn about policy effectiveness. Learning is conceptualized in the
simulation as states’ ability to memorize and compare past experiences.
Specifically, learning is implemented with the help of two components: comparing
mean policy effectiveness and observing the trend of policy effectiveness.
Scenario 1: individual learning – no diffusion. In the first scenario, states are constructed
as individual learners. This means that states are able to memorize and compare
policy effectiveness, but they only rely on their own experiences. In consequence,
states which have experience with only one policy can only take information about
the effectiveness of this policy into account. The effectiveness of the other policy
remains unclear. Therefore, policy change in this scenario is influenced by learning
but is not driven by diffusion. The utility that states receive from changing to the











Here, Eksq;t represents the effectiveness of the status quo policy. Any payoff related
to ideological or electoral concerns is not considered explicitly. Since this article is
interested in the effects of learning about policy effectiveness, these payoffs are kept
constant over policy alternatives and time. States thus evaluate the effectiveness of
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the current status quo policy to solve the problem at hand, which states weigh with
two additional factors.





, reflects states’ ability to compare. Specifically,
this factor tries to incorporate states’ ability to compare the mean effectiveness they
received from the alternative policy, Ekother (if they already had adopted this alterna-
tive policy for at least one time period), with the mean effectiveness they received
from their current status quo policy, Eksq, in past periods. If states have experienced
a mean effectiveness of the alternative policy greater than the mean effectiveness of
the status quo policy, this factor is greater than 1 and the utility from change
increases. If states have experienced a greater mean effectiveness of the status quo





, reflects states’ ability to observe the trend of policy
effectiveness. This should incorporate the intuition that states are less likely to give
up their status quo policy if this policy shows a positive trend, i.e. if its effectiveness





reduces the utility from change. Should states have experience with only one policy
or only have experience with the status quo policy in one period, the respective fac-
tor (mean and/or trend) defaults to 1.
Scenario 2: social learning—diffusion. In a second scenario, policy change is modeled as
a process of policy diffusion through social learning. This means (again) that states
have the ability to compare mean policy effectiveness and to observe the trend of
policy effectiveness. However, in this scenario, states not only consider their own
experience but also mainly focus on the experience of other states in the state sys-
tem; their neighbor states. In this sense, the term ‘social learning’ simply means
learning from others. In consequence, the equation for the utility from change
essentially takes the same form as in the previous scenario. State k does not only
consider the effectiveness of its own status quo policy at time t (Eksq;t), but also the
experiences of neighboring states N that currently have state k’s status quo policy














To ensure that policy decisions in this scenario are the result of diffusion, the
outside experience of neighbors is given more weight than states’ individual experi-
ences. This is accomplished by adding the power d, with d .1, to the equation. This









\1 further reduces the utility from change. In turn, a negative
experience results in an ever higher utility from change.
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4. Structure of the simulation
The simulation defines a grid of 737 squares where each square represents an
agent, i.e. a state. This way, the simulation includes 49 states approximating the
number of continental US states often used in the context of spatial lag regressions.
Since states are arranged within a square, each state has eight neighbors. These can
be interpreted to be geographic neighbors, cultural neighbors, or economically
related states. Only states located at the fringes of the square have fewer neighbors.
At every time step in the simulation, each state chooses between two policies. This
means that states consider whether to stick to their status quo policy or to change
to the alternative policy. One policy is constructed to be more effective than the
other policy in solving a problem common to all states. Initially, each state is
assigned the less effective policy. Two factors are essential for the decision to adopt
an alternative policy in all scenarios of the simulation: the state’s threshold for
change (TCk;t) and the observed policy effectiveness (E
k
i;t).
To make states heterogeneous, thresholds for change TCk;t
 
are assigned to each
state by drawing random numbers from a uniform distribution at the beginning of the
simulation (t=0). This way, the simulation tries to account for the fact that political
constraints and institutional frictions are not the same for all states in the real world.
One run in the simulation comprises 10 time steps. This could be interpreted as
one run representing governments making a decision of maintaining or changing
the status quo policy once every year for a 10-year period in office or twice every
year for a five-year period in office. Since policy learning is simulated under politi-
cal stability, such a low number of time steps seems appropriate.5
To account for policy volatility, states’ decisions to give up their status quo pol-
icy and adopt the policy alternative are modeled so that they are not necessarily
definitive. In other words, states do not have to stick to their first policy decision
forever. Instead, states can potentially change back and forth between the more
and the less effective policy if they want to. Yet, the simulation accounts for the
political costs that arise from such volatility. Correcting own policy decisions and
correcting the corrections is rarely a politically opportune endeavor. While new
information about policy effectiveness might call for such corrections, changing
your mind about something while in office can be used for political attacks by
opposition parties and the media and thus potentially carries costs. To implement
this argument in the simulation, the threshold for policy change TCk;t
 
doubles after
every policy change. Correcting a previous policy decision is thus twice as hard as
making the previous decision. With every policy change by a certain government,
the government will need a much higher perceived effectiveness of the alternative
policy in order to be willing to change its status quo policy one more time.
One of the advantages of simulation studies is that they allow researchers to con-
duct a baseline run and then experimentally alter parameter values to see how these
alterations affect the results within a controlled environment. This opportunity is
used to see how the introduction of imperfect information influences the dynamics
of policy adoption in both scenarios. Thus, a baseline run is conducted in which
states are able to observe objectively the effectiveness of each policy alternative.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Subsequently, imperfect information is imposed accounting for the fact that asses-
sing a policy’s effectiveness is no trivial task. Instead, information regarding policy
effectiveness is likely to contain ‘noise’ which obscures the ‘true’ policy effective-
ness. Table 1 summarizes the parameter settings for the baseline run and the experi-
mental run. In the baseline run, the policies’ levels of effectiveness are fixed to 1
and 2. In the experimental run, I introduce uncertainty by drawing the respective
policy effectiveness randomly from two normal distributions with mean 1 and 2
and a standard deviation of 0.25. In this sense, a higher standard deviation reflects
noisier information regarding policy effectiveness. Each scenario (consisting of 10
time steps) is run 100 times to capture probabilistic variation.
This approach towards imperfect information is similar to the one chosen by
Volden et al. (2008) in that a policy’s true level of effectiveness is only realized with a
certain probability. Yet, in contrast to the binary approach adopted by Volden et al.
(2008), this article, with its continuous concept of policy effectiveness, includes
imperfect information by introducing ‘noise’ as a continuous probabilistic compo-
nent to states’ perception leading states randomly to underestimate or overestimate
policy effectiveness. Furthermore, the article diverges from the approach by Volden
et al. (2008) in that the knowledge about imperfect information does not turn states
into strategic learners that can decide to hold back on policy experimentation in a
first period and profit from the experiences made elsewhere for policy choices in a
second period. Instead, this article assumes states to be social learners. It adopts a
decision-theoretic perspective assuming that an alternative policy is chosen whenever
evidence about the superiority of this policy over the status quo policy is sufficient.
All relevant simulation parameters are displayed in Table 1. While the simulation
is, of course, sensitive to the specification of values of key parameters, Table 4 in
Appendix A shows that the results are robust for a broad range in parameter values.
5. Simulation results
Figure 1 displays the results of the simulation. It shows the aggregate adoption pat-
terns of the four simulated scenarios which include policy adoption patterns in the
individual learning scenario with perfect (square I) and imperfect (square II) infor-
mation as well as patterns in the diffusion scenario with perfect (square III) and
imperfect information (square IV). These plots capture the percentage of states in
the simulation that possess the more effective policy at each of the 10 time steps in
an individual run of the simulation. Such a run is repeated 100 times for each sce-
nario. The limits of the grey areas in these plots indicate the minimum and maxi-
mum share of states that possess the more effective policy at each point in time.
The black line in the middle of the grey areas captures the mean share of states with
the more effective policy as average over all of the 100 runs of the simulation.
Figure 1 illustrates that temporal patterns of policy diffusion differ visibly
between the scenarios. When states receive perfect information, the difference
between individual learning and social learning (diffusion) is most apparent. In the
individual learning scenario (square I) adoption patterns resemble a slow linear
increase. On average, about 20% of the states have adopted the more effective
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policy at the end of the 10 time steps. When states have the opportunity to take the
experience of other states into account (square III), we observe a greater spread of
the more effective policy as at the end of 10 time steps more than 90% of states
have on average adopted the more effective policy. The spread is not only greater
but also achieved relatively quickly.
The introduction of imperfect information changes the dynamics of policy adop-
tion in both scenarios visibly. First, both scenarios move closer together in terms of
how far the more effective policy has spread after 10 time steps. This is a result of a
wider spread of the more effective policy in the individual learner scenario (square
II) and a weaker spread in the diffusion scenario (square IV). This effect has two
sources. First, the introduction of imperfect information enhances states’ willing-
ness to engage in policy experiments more quickly in both scenarios. This is most
visible in the individual learner scenario, but also present in the diffusion scenario
where the grey area is much narrower in the first couple of time steps under imper-
fect information than under perfect information because runs with a slower spread
Figure 1. Spread of the more effective policy.
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of policy adoptions are eliminated. As long as states only have information about
the effectiveness of the initial policy, they only abandon this initial policy and
experiment with the alternative policy when their perception of the effectiveness of
the current policy is sufficiently low. Imperfect information sometimes leads states
to underestimate (and overestimate) this level of policy effectiveness. Due to the
underestimation of policy effectiveness, the threshold for change is reached in more
states quicker under imperfect than under perfect information. Second, this effect
is the result of an enhanced degree of policy volatility in both diffusion scenarios
(see Figure 2). Social learners seem to be more likely to correct previous policy
experiments than are individual learners. With imperfect information, this volatility
in the social learning scenario is so enhanced that even the aggregate share of states
with the more effective policy decreases slightly after a quick initial increase. This
aspect of policy volatility will be discussed in the next section.
5.1. Patterns of policy volatility
One of the key results of the simulation is its suggestion that the presence of policy
volatility is a genuine feature of the diffusion scenarios. Figure 2 captures the
degree of policy volatility in terms of the number of policy changes per state includ-
ing density estimates in the form of four histograms.
Policy volatility refers to the reversal of previous policy decisions. Specifically, I
consider policies to be volatile when initial policy decisions are reversed at least
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number of policy changes
Graphs by diffusion and imperfect information
Figure 2. Policy volatility—frequency of policy change.
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between the two policy options. Since this article is interested in patterns of policy
diffusion under political stability, and assumes that reversing one’s own previous
policy decisions imposes political costs, it is not surprising that policy volatility is a
rather rare phenomenon.
Yet, how rare it is, seems to crucially depend on whether policy decisions are
taken independently by individual learners or interdependently by social learners.
More specifically, under perfect information none of the 49 states constructed as
individual learners changed its policy more than once within the period of 10 time
steps over 100 runs of the simulation. States either never changed their initial policy
or changed it only once. This picture hardly changes when imperfect information is
introduced. While this generally enhances states’ willingness to experiment with a
policy alternative quicker—zero policy changes occur less frequently—imperfect
information does not trigger policy volatility in the individual learner scenario (in
only four out of 4900 possible occasions are two policy changes recorded). In con-
trast, when states are constructed as interdependent social learners, policy volatility
becomes a relevant feature of policy dynamics. Even with perfect information
about policy effectiveness, states change policies twice, three times, and even four
times in over 12% of the time. In the scenario with imperfect information, states
adopt two policy changes in about 32% and three policy changes in about 31% of
the time. One consequence of this is that states with an even number of policy
changes finish the simulation run with the same (less effective) policy with which
they orginally started.
Table 2 complements these descriptive statistics of nominal frequencies by pre-
senting results of a regression conducted on the basis of data from the simulation.
The dependent variable in the regression is policy volatility in each state as cap-
tured by the frequency with which each state is observed to switch policies within
10 time steps in the observation. Due to the count data character of the dependent
Table 2. Determinants of policy volatility.
Poisson regression model
Model I Model II
diffusion 1.55** 1.49**
(0.02) (0.03)
imperfect information 0.55** 0.47**
(0.02) (0.04)




Pseudo R 0.20 0.20
N 19600 19600
Remarks: Coefficients represent unstandardized Poisson regression coefficients. Standard errors in brackets.
*and ** reflect statistical significance on the 5% and 1% level. Data are generated by the simulation.
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variable, i.e. the fact that it can only take values of non-negative integers, a Poisson
regression model seems appropriate (Winkelmann, 2008). The number of observations
is the result of 49 states in the simulation for which the number of policy switches are
recorded over 10 times steps for 100 runs for each of four scenarios (49 states34
scenarios3100 runs=19,600 observations containing the number of policy changes
over 10 times steps). These runs differ since there are probabilistic elements built into
the simulation. For example, policy effectiveness at each point in time for each indi-
vidual state is drawn randomly from a normal distribution (see Table 1). The data
analyzed can thus be interpreted as a random sample of the general population of all
possible simulation runs. The different scenarios are identified by dummy variables
for diffusion and imperfect information. If the coefficients for these dummy variables
were sufficiently small in comparison to estimated standard errors, the regression anal-
ysis would reject the argument that the degree of policy volatility varied systematically
instead of randomly between the scenarios. It thus assesses the null hypothesis of no
systematic difference in the degree of policy volatility between the different scenarios.
Regression results support the argument of systematic variance in the degree of
policy volatility between the scenarios. Coefficients for the dummy variables diffu-
sion and imperfect information are positive with standard errors sufficiently small
to accept statistical significance on conventionally accepted levels. Both policy dif-
fusion through social learning and the presence of imperfect information thus seem
to enhance the frequency of policy changes. Furthermore, the positive coefficient
for the variable diffusion in model II including the interaction term indicates the
following: under perfect information (i.e. imperfect information=0), this frequency
is greater under policy diffusion than under the individual learning scenario.
Furthermore, estimates for the interaction term between both dummy variables
indicate that the effect of introducing imperfect information on the frequency of
policy change is even greater when states learn from others (i.e. when diffusion=1)
than its effect when they learn from their own experiences (i.e. when diffusion=0).
In the light of these results, policy volatility can be seen as a feature that is pre-
dominantly associated with interdependent decision-making. Furthermore, policy
volatility is not the result of a process that sets in after the complete spread of the
more effective policy (at time step 6 in Figure 1, square III illustrating diffusion
under perfect information). Instead, the process leading up to the complete spread
of the more effective policy is already characterized by volatility. After a complete
spread of the more effective policy, volatility dissolves because its underlying cause
dissolves. The susceptibility to policy experiments made elsewhere becomes irrele-
vant when policy experiments do not occur any longer.6
5.2. Spatial patterns
While the patterns of policy adoption under diffusion and individual learning differ
visibly when analyzed in terms of aggregated temporal patterns (see Figure 1) and
in terms of policy volatility (see Figure 2), this difference can become blurred when
policy adoptions are analyzed in terms of their spatial patterns. Figure 3 illustrates
the spatial patterns resulting from the simualtion after 10 time steps.7
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Under perfect information, the policy maps resulting from the individual learn-
ing scenario and the diffusion scenario differ visibly. Under individual learning,
the few states with the more effective policy (grey boxes) appear to be spread out
randomly all over the map. In contrast, under diffusion the map seems to consist
of one big cluster of states holding on to the more effective policy with just a few
remaining isolated islands of states holding on to the less effective policy: under
perfect information, the presence of policy clusters is thus clearly visible in the dif-
fusion scenario and clearly absent in the individual learning scenario.
This picture changes substantially under imperfect information. With imperfect
information, the shares of states holding on to the more effective policy under pol-
icy diffusion and individual learning move closer together (see Figure 1). This
results in a situation in which the two sceanrios (diffusion and individual learning)
are difficult to tell apart, as illustrated by Figure 3. While states with the more
effective policy still seem to form spatial clusters in the diffusion scenario, these
clusters also seem to be present in the individual learning scenario. Due to the wide
Figure 3. Spatial patterns.
Note: black squares indicate states holding the less effective policy after 10 runs; grey squares indicate states
holding the more effective policy after 10 runs. The Figure represents the results of the final of 100 runs of
each simulation.
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spread of the more effective policy within a relatively small and closed network of
states, the formation of spatial clusters is almost inevitable.
This graphical impression is underlined when conducting a simple, spatial lag
regression that models the adoption of the more effective policy as a function of
the adoption of this policy in a state’s eight neighboring states (Table 3).
The data used for the analysis are generated by one run of the simulation over
10 time steps (490 observations=49 states for 10 time steps). Again, this run can
be interpreted to represent a randomly selected run from the population of all pos-
sible simulation runs due to the probabilistic elements that are built into the simu-
lation. Since the dependent variable in this case is the policy currently held by each
respective state, it only takes the values 0 (for the less effective policy) and 1 (for
the more effective policy). Consequently, a logistic regression model is specified. It
is able to assess whether the spatial lag variable—representing the share of a state’s
neighboring states holding on to the more effective policy—is independent of the
probability that this state also features the more effective policy.
Under perfect information, this null hypothesis is rejected for the diffusion sce-
nario (model 2) but not for the individual learner scenario (model 1). Under these
conditions, one is thus able to correctly differentiate between diffusion and individ-
ual learning from statistical results based on a spatial lag variable. Since the true
mechanism underlying policy adoption in these scenarios is known, it is evident that
conclusions from these results yield true positive (model 2) and true negative (model
1) results.
Under imperfect information, regression results only allow for true positive con-
clusions about the nature of policy adoption when there is indeed diffusion (model).
For the independent learner scenario, for which we know that policy decisions are
independent, the analysis proposes to reject this null hypothesis of independent
decision-making. Standard errors for the spatial lag coefficient are sufficiently small
to impose this conclusion based on conventionally accepted levels of statistical sig-
nifance. While this leads to the conclusion that policy adoption is driven by policy
diffusion, we know that this is a false positive conclusion. We know that the true
underlying mechanism is one of independent individual learning.8
Table 3. Logistic regression with spatial lag.









spatial lag 1.63 5.61*** 2.22*** 2.81***
(1.75) (0.84) (0.74) (0.46)
constant –1.89*** –2.98*** –1.60*** –1.41***
(0.47) (0.43) (0.28) (0.24)
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.45 0.04 0.10
N 490 490 490 490
Remarks: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Robust standard errors for 49 state clusters in
brackets. Data are generated by the simulation. *** reflects significance at 1% level.
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5.3. Propositions
Two propositions follow from the simulation results. First, the simulation suggests
that the larger the share of states having adopted the more effective policy, the
higher is the probability that any adoption pattern will look like a spatially clus-
tered adoption pattern. When 80% of states in one’s sample adopt a certain policy
within a relatively short period of time, observing spatial clusters becomes almost
inevitable—whether there is diffusion at play or not. This is the simulation’s first
proposition. The simulation is able to demonstrate the commonly expressed point
of criticism concerning analyses relying on the identification of policy clusters to
draw conclusions about the relevance of diffusion and interdependent policy deci-
sions: these analyses can lead to false positive results (Volden et al., 2008).
Proposition 1: Analyses relying on the identification of policy clusters to draw conclusions
about policy diffusion are susceptible to false positive results when a certain policy inno-
vation is adopted by a high share of states within a relatively short period of time.
Second, simulation results indicate that the concept of policy volatility can be
helpful to differentiate between policy diffusion and independent decision-making.
Of course, switching policies several times under political stability is generally rare.
Yet, if it occurs, it is a strong indicator for interdependent policy-making. At first
glance, this result might seem counter-intuitive. One might think that states that
learn from the experience of their peers acquire more information, i.e. are able to
work with more data points, and thus are quick to identify the superior policy and
stick to it. The simulation suggests that this is only part of the story, however. In the
system consisting of social learners the superior policy is indeed adopted by more
states quicker. Yet, these states seem less capable of hanging on to this superior policy
for long. This is because the exposure to the experience of others makes states reactive
to policy experiments in other states. Change is more likely when states become aware
of what seems to be a better policy solution for others. In consequence, states that
learn from their peers are more regularly exposed to seemingly superior policy options
and are therefore more likely to change policies. This volatility of policy decisions is
caused not by the characteristics of individual states, but by their interaction. It is the
interdependence of the state system which drives this policy volatility. If one state
changes its status quo policy, it does so because it perceives this policy to have super-
ior effectiveness. Yet, if this state perceives superior effectiveness from the alternative
policy, then so will its neighboring states. This makes them more likely to switch to
this policy alternative as a result of one of their neighbors switching which introduces
positive feedback loops to the state system. That positive feedback loops induce
instability is a well-known feature of complex systems (Miller and Page, 2007).
Furthermore, if a government introduces a policy innovation and subsequently
decides to abolish the innovation and move back to the previous status quo, it
might still be able to justify such a decision with evidence from national experiences
regarding disappointing effectiveness of the policy innovation. A re-introduction of
the policy innovation by the same government depends, however, on the existence
of strong evidence about the effectiveness of the policy innovation found elsewhere.
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In other words, only if the policy innovation is seen to work everywhere else will a
policy innovation that was once abolished even have a chance of being re-intro-
duced. States only looking at their own experience are by definition blind to such
evidence, however.
Policy volatility is further enhanced by imperfect information as the overestima-
tion and underestimation of policy effectiveness increases the willingness of indi-
vidual states to engage in policy experiments. This is because critical thresholds for
policy change are reached more often when policy effectiveness is overestimated
and underestimated. Due to the interdependence of policy-making, this enhanced
willingness to change the policy status quo translates into an enhanced level of pol-
icy volatility if information about policy effectiveness is imperfect. The instability
of policy decisions, i.e. their volatility, is—according to the simulation—the result
of interdependence of policy decisions. The introduction of misperceptions of pol-
icy effectiveness further destabilizes these decisions as it brings more activity (pol-
icy changes) to the state system.
Proposition 2: As states are observed to reverse previous policy decisions more than once
under political stability, the probability that this policy volatility is due to policy diffusion
resulting from interdependent policy decisions by social learners increases substantially.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This article uses agent-based computerized simulation to model the dynamics of
policy adoption. It does so in order to generate theoretical propositions about pol-
icy diffusion by indicating unique features of policy diffusion that can be exploited
in empirical research designs. To do so, the article presents policy adoption patterns
under four different scenarios that differ with respect to (a) states’ ability to learn
from the experience of other states and (b) the kind of information states receive
about policy effectiveness (perfect vs imperfect). Controlled variation of these fac-
tors in the simulation allows for the creation of a computerized laboratory and the
simulation of experimental conditions. Decisions about whether or not to change
the current policy are simulated under political stability and under the consider-
ation of political costs induced by the need to correct former policy decisions.
Based on the simulation results, the article formulates two propositions. First,
relying on the identification of policy clusters can lead to false positive conclusions
about the relevance of diffusion when a large share of one’s sample adopts a certain
policy within a relatively short period of time. Second, the concept of policy volati-
lity can help to minimize the risk of such false positive conclusions. Both proposi-
tions yield empirically testable hypotheses.
These results can enrich diffusion research in at least two ways. First, the simula-
tion suggests that policy volatility can be used as a complementary criterion for
studies interested in the question of whether or not policies diffuse. If there is a
non-zero number of states changing their policies more than once under political
stability, then this is a strong indication for policy diffusion. For the sake of simpli-
city, the simulation has focused on policy volatility as vacillation between two
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policy options. Empirical studies could easily consider policy volatility in terms of
states switching back and forth between several different policy options. Of course,
the absence of policy volatility should not be mistaken for an indicator of the irrele-
vance of policy diffusion (many states in the diffusion scenario only change policies
once). Policy decisions on smoking bans and gambling policy have been shown to
depend strongly on decisions made elsewhere (e.g. Berry and Berry, 1990; Jensen,
2003; Shipan and Volden, 2008) without being volatile. In other words, solely rely-
ing on policy volatility will often lead to false negative conclusions about policy dif-
fusion (type-II errors, to use the statistical analogy again). Yet, if states change
policies frequently under political stability, then—according to the simulation
results—these states are likely to attribute a lot of weight to the experiences with
policy effectiveness made elsewhere. Therefore, despite this risk to produce false
negative results, the tendency to avoid false positive results makes the criterion of
policy volatility a valuable indicator able to complement evidence about policy
clusters.
Second, policy volatility can be a helpful tool informing case selection of diffu-
sion studies using comparative case studies and causal process-tracing to investi-
gate underlying causes of interdependent policy-making. Researchers intending to
use process-tracing to analyze the underlying cause of policy diffusion, i.e. answer
the question of why certain states let external information strongly influence
domestic policy decisions, need to know where to allocate their resources: in which
states can the relevant outcome, i.e. the interdependence of a specific policy deci-
sion, most likely be traced back to its roots? The criterion of policy volatility can
inform this decision. This can be illustrated with an example from nuclear energy
policy. In order to see what causes a government to make its domestic nuclear
energy policy strongly dependent on policy decisions and experiences made else-
where, focusing on the volatile policy decisions of the German government pro-
mises to be a fruitful strategy. Specifically, the simulation would suggest that the
flip-flop on nuclear energy of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, represented
a most-likely case of interdependent decision-making. After her government coali-
tion had ended the exit from nuclear energy—by passing legislation extending con-
tracts with German suppliers of nuclear energy—the exit was quickly re-introduced
by Merkel’s government with the imposition of a ‘moratorium’ for German nuclear
power plants after a disastrous earthquake triggered a nuclear catastrophe in
Japan. Merkel claimed that this policy change was necessary after the events in
Japan revealed new information about the potential dangers of nuclear power pro-
duction (German Federal Government, 2011). This indicates that the volatility of
the German policy decision was indeed strongly influenced by social learning and
underlines how choosing diffusion cases on the criterion of policy volatility can be
a fruitful strategy for researchers looking for most-likely diffusion cases because
they want to investigate the process that links available information on policy effec-
tiveness to the actual (interdependent) policy decisions.
In sum, this article hopes to inspire more research using agent-based computer
simulation in the context of policy diffusion. It hopes to have demonstrated that
simulations can be a valuable source of theoretical innovation in this area.
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Appendix A
Any simulation is sensitive to changes in parameter values. Table 4 shows how sen-
sitive the simulation presented in this article is to changes in parameter values.
Simulation results can only be considered to be robust if they are realized for a
range of parameter values. Table 4 indicates for which parameter values the simu-
lation results are robust.
Appendix B
In the main part of the article, states were observed for 10 time steps in which they
could decide for either policy. The Figure 4 displays results for a longer time period.
Here, states chose 100 times. Results for this higher number of time steps remain
essentially the same. The incremental increase in the individual learning scenario
results in a wider final spread of the more effective policy. While the S-curve pattern
typical for diffusion processes is less evident than in Figure 1, due to the different
scale of the x-axis, it is still present. Furthermore, policy volatility is still a unique
feature of the diffusion scenarios. In fact, it becomes clear that, in the diffusion sce-
narios, relevant changes occur relatively early in the simulation. After these early
developments equilibria are achieved. Interestingly, under imperfect information,
the sub-optimal equilibrium is particularly evident as the more effective policy
never manages to spread fully throughout the state system in the social learner sce-
nario (square IV). Due to the high political costs of changing policies several times,
some states remain stuck with the less effective policy.
Table 4. Robustness of the simulation.
Parameter
name






diffusion parameter d 2 1  d 3
number of states n.states 49 25
mean performance of less effective
policy
e0 1  1
mean performance of more
effective policy
e1 2  1.1
power in logistic function
determining the probability of
policy change
g -5 -5 –2 g –9
uncertainty / standard deviation of
policy performance
sde0, sde1 0 0.25  0.25
factor of threshold increase after
each policy change
incr 2 2  2
percentage of states with the less
effective policy as initial policy
initial.perc 100%  25%
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Notes
1. The simulation code will be available for replication of results from the author’s personal
website at: www.christianadam.org.
2. Kultusministerkonferenz.
3. This re-introduction was, however, less far-reaching in scope (Eisenberg, 2006).
4. Modeling social decisions as stochastic functions of logistic types reflects a probabilistic
threshold model of decision-making and is common for agent-based models (e.g.
Cederman, 2003). Change is more likely to occur when a certain threshold in the utility
Figure 4. Spread of the more effective policy in a per cent of all states.
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of change is reached. The more the utility of change exceeds the threshold, the more
likely change occurs.
5. The results remain robust, however, when including more time-steps per simulation run.
In fact, the simulation’s main message (as formulated in the discussion) becomes more
accentuated for increasing numbers of time-steps per run (see Appendix B).
6. These results are evident when running the simulation with just six time steps and when
running the simulation with the more effective policy as the initial policy. These results
can be replicated with the replication code from the author’s website.
7. While the simulation models connectivity between states through geography, the result-
ing map could just as well be interpreted as connectivity in terms of economic or cultural
connectivity between states.
8. This result should not be mistaken for proof that spatial lag regression will necessarily
produce false positive results. That is not the point. Other specifications of the statistical
model might very well be able to distinguish correctly between the scenarios. Instead, the
result underlines that spatial lag regression can lead to false positive conclusions.
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Gilardi F, Flüglister K and Luyet S (2009) Learning from others: the diffusion of hospital
financing reforms in OECD countries. Comparative Political Studies 42(4): 549–573.
Hall PA (1993) Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic
policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25(3): 275–296.
Heclo H (1974) Modern Social Politics in Britain and in Sweden. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Jensen JL (2003) Policy diffusion through institutional legitimation: state lotteries. Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory 13(4): 521–541.
Kollman K, Miller JH and Page SE (1992) Adaptive parties and spatial elections. American
Political Science Review 86(4): 929–937.
Lustick IS, Miodownik D and Eidelson RJ (2004) Secessionism in multicultural states: does
sharing power prevent or encourage it? American Political Science Review 98(2): 209–230.
Luyet S (2009) An agent-based approach of the international diffusion of welfare state
reforms. Presented at the Annual Swiss Political Science Association Congress, St Gall,
Switzerland.
Meseguer YC (2009) Learning, Policy making, and Market Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Miller JH and Page SE (2007) Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computational
Models of Social Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pigeon M (2012) Remunicipalisation Putting Water Back into Public Hands. Amsterdam, the
Netherlands: Transnational Institute.
Rapaport O, Levi-Faur D and Miodownik D (2009) The puzzle of the diffusion of central-
bank independence reforms: insights from an agent-based simulation. Policy Studies
Journal 37(4): 695–716.
Rose R (1991) What is lesson-drawing? Journal of Public Policy 11(3): 3–30.
Sabatier PA (1988) An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of
policy-oriented learning therein. Policy Sciences 21(2/3): 129–168.
Shipan CR and Volden C (2008) The mechanisms of policy diffusion. American Journal of
Political Science 52(4): 840–857.
Simmons B and Elkins Z (2004) The globalization of liberalization: policy diffusion in the
international political economy. American Political Science Review 98(1): 171–189.
Strang D and Macy MW (2001) In search of excellence: fads, success stories, and adaptive
emulation. American Journal of Sociology 107(1): 147–182.
Vicsek T (2002) Complexity: the bigger picture. Science 418: 131.
Volden C, Ting MM and Carpenter DP (2008) A formal model of learning and policy
diffusion. American Political Science Review 102(3): 319–332.
Vriend NJ (2000) An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social
learning, and its consequences for computational analyses. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 24(1): 1–19.
Ward H and John P (2013) Competitive learning in yardstick competition: testing models of
policy diffusion with performance data. Political Science Research and Methods 1(01): 3–25.
Winkelmann R (2008) Econometric Analysis of Count Data. Berlin, Germany: Springer.
Adam 519
